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One of the hallmarks of human existence is that we all hold beliefs that determine how
we act. Amongst such beliefs, the idea that we are endowed with free will appears to
be linked to prosocial behaviors, probably by enhancing the feeling of responsibility of
individuals over their own actions. However, such effects appear to be more complex
that one might have initially thought. Here, we aimed at exploring how induced disbeliefs
in free will impact the sense of agency over the consequences of one’s own actions
in a paradigm that engages morality. To do so, we asked participants to choose to
inflict or to refrain from inflicting an electric choc to another participant in exchange of a
small financial benefit. Our results show that participants who were primed with a text
defending neural determinism – the idea that humans are a mere bunch of neurons
guided by their biology – administered fewer shocks and were less vindictive toward
the other participant. Importantly, this finding only held for female participants. These
results show the complex interaction between gender, (dis)beliefs in free will and moral
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
People’s choice to act morally or not, that is, to carry out actions that are judged to be morally
“right” or “wrong” is unsurprisingly shaped by many factors, ranging from genetics to education,
from circumstances to religious beliefs. Amongst those many determinants, one is of particular
interest because it subsumes the influence of many others: Our own beliefs about the extent to
which we are free agents or, by contrast, our own beliefs that what we do is ultimately determined
by factors upon which we have no control, such as the will of a god or the neural activity of our
brains. The influence that belief or disbelief in free will exerts on behavior has attracted considerable
interest recently (e.g., Schooler, 2010), in part because such beliefs are intimately connected with
the judicial concept of responsibility. Indeed, our concept of responsibility, from a judicial point of
view, is largely dependent on the general assumption that a defendant could have “done otherwise,”
which itself presupposes that individuals are endowed with the freedom to choose their actions.
On this basis, it has thus been argued that reducing people’s belief in free will could weaken
their beliefs in moral responsibility, thereby possibly modifying the moral character of their
subsequent behavior. Congruently, a substantial body of scientific research has highlighted the
prosocial benefits of believing in free will, as well as the negative effects of denying its existence
(e.g., Wegner, 2002; Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009; Leotti et al., 2010;
Stillman et al., 2010). For instance, Baumeister et al. (2009) suggested that people who believe
in free will exhibit a higher prosocial and altruistic behavior, and Vohs and Schooler (2008)
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observed that participants who were primed with disbelief
in free will cheated more often than a group of control
participants. According to Baumeister (2008), believing in free
will increases one’s motivation and willingness to make efforts,
therefore resulting in higher self-control. This argument has been
supported by recent electroencephalography studies showing
that inducing disbelief in free will changes the neural processes
underlying voluntary action (Rigoni et al., 2011) and post error
adaptation (Rigoni et al., 2013, 2015). Behavioral studies have
likewise shown that the feeling of agency, that is, the pre-reflective
feeling of being in control of one’s own actions (Synofzik et al.,
2008) was reduced when participants were primed with disbelief
in free will (Aarts and van den Bos, 2011; Lynn et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, these “pro free will” arguments remain quite
controversial (Miles, 2013). Some studies have indicated that
believing in determinism may also have positive effects (Westlake
and Paulhus, 2007; Krueger et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014). For
instance, Shariff et al. (2014) showed that people who believe in
determinism exhibit reduced retributive attitudes toward others.
Congruently, Krueger et al. (2014) showed that people who
strongly believe in free will tend to be more punitive. In the
same line of thought, Westlake and Paulhus (2007) observed
that people who scored high on free will tended to assign
more severe sentences to offenders. However, these studies all
used fictitious scenarios involving hypothetical protagonists.
Typically, participants are asked to read vignettes that describe
a criminal event and have to choose which punishment the
protagonist of the story should receive. Thus, claims that
(dis)belief in free will changes moral behavior have still to be
corroborated in a more ecological paradigm.
To understand why people choose moral or immoral actions,
one should use a more proper method which would consist in
assessing how people experience their own responsibility while
performing actions with different consequences toward others.
The feeling of being responsible is strongly related to the sense of
agency (SoA), that is, the feeling that we are the author of our own
actions and their consequences in the external world (Moretto
et al., 2011). Noteworthy, the SoA is not a unitary phenomenon,
but is rather constituted of different conscious experiences of
authorship. Recent conceptual developments have separated the
feeling of agency from the judgment of agency (Synofzik et al.,
2008). The judgment of agency refers to the explicit declaration
that an outcome was (or not) caused by our own actions, while
the feeling of agency refers to a pre-reflective sensorimotor
experience of being the author of an action. Haggard et al. (2002)
developed the intentional binding paradigm to assess this implicit
feeling of agency. In this paradigm, participants have to estimate
the delay between their action (i.e., a key press) and an outcome
(i.e., a tone). If the movement is voluntary, the perceived time is
shorter than in a condition in which the movement is involuntary
(for instance, triggered by a TMS pulse over the motor cortex),
suggesting that sense of being the author of an action modifies
time perception, by reducing it (see also Wenke and Haggard,
2009).
In the present study, we aimed to explore how disbelief in
free will impacts people’s behavior as well as their SoA over the
consequences of their own actions. To investigate this issue, we
used an experimental manipulation of belief in free will (Vohs
and Schooler, 2008) together with the paradigm developed by
Caspar et al. (2016). In the latter study, two participants (the
“agent” and the “victim”) took turns to administer (or not)
electrical shocks to each other in order to receive a small financial
benefit. In two conditions, participants were free or coerced to
deliver or not those electrical shocks.
We assessed to what extent (dis)belief in free will impacts or
not three major effects: (1) the number of socially unacceptable
actions that participants carry out, (2) participants’ vindictive
behavior over their co-participant, and (3) participants’ SoA
over those action effects. (1) According to previous studies,
disbelief in free will increases antisocial behavior (e.g., Vohs and
Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009). Therefore, we expected
that participants primed with disbelief in free will will inflict more
painful electric shocks to the “victim” when they are free to decide
which action to perform. (2) The literature has highlighted that
disbelief in free will also has prosocial effects, mainly by reducing
vindictive behaviors (e.g., Krueger et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014).
In Caspar et al.’s (2016) study, participants who played the role
of victim first tended to administer more shocks than they had
received when subsequently playing the role of the agent, thus
behaving vindictively. We expect to observe a reduction of this
vindictive behavior when participants are primed with disbelief in
free will. (3) Several studies have shown that intentional binding
was reduced when people were primed with disbelief in free
will, suggesting a reduced SoA (e.g., Aarts and van den Bos,
2011; Lynn et al., 2014). However, only neutral outcomes (i.e.,
neutral tones) were used in such studies; whereas it is reasonable
to consider that this effect could be mediated by the valence
associated with each particular outcome. Indeed, in daily life,
the actions that we choose to carry out often have valenced
effects, for instance by producing a benefit for someone else.
In the same vein, negative action effects have been showed to
reduce intentional binding (e.g., Yoshie and Haggard, 2013).
Given that SoA is intimately linked to responsibility (Moretto
et al., 2011), the effect of disbelief in free will could also modify
the SoA over positive and negative action effects, which is of
importance to understand what guides the decision to perform
morally acceptable or unacceptable actions.
Importantly, the method of Vohs and Schooler (2008)
proposes to compare two groups of participants, one primed
with disbelief in free will and one primed with a neutral excerpt.
However, the mere reading a neutral excerpt does not necessarily
imply that participants in this group strongly belief in free will. In
the present study, we therefore also assessed people’s core beliefs
in free will and determinism prior to the manipulation, so as to
investigate to what extent they mediate the observed effects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty right-handed and naïve participants (20 females) were
recruited by dyads. Dyads were not mixed across gender. During
the recruitment procedure, we ensured that participants were not
close friends or relatives by creating the triads ourselves based
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on their age or on the courses they attended. The sample size
was based on estimated power size considering our experimental
design. Participants received between €12 and €18 for their
participation. The following exclusion criteria were decided in
advance of the experiment: failure to produce temporal intervals
covarying monotonically with actual action-tone interval, or
failure to follow instructions. To identify participants for whom
the action-tone intervals did not gradually increase with action-
tone intervals, we performed a linear trend analysis with contrast
coefficients −1, 0, 1 for the three delays we used. Three
participants were excluded due to a non-significant linear trend
analysis. Given that two of these participants belonged to the
same group, we immediately re-tested an additional pair to avoid
differences between groups. For the remaining participants, the
mean age was 22.54 years old (SD = 2.83). Importantly, the
mean age was the same regardless of gender (p > 0.9) or group
(p > 0.3). All participants provided written informed consent
prior to the experiment. The study was approved by the local
ethical committee of the Université libre de Bruxelles (008/2016).
Materials and Procedure
Several days (between 3 and 5) before their participation,
participants completed two questionnaires online: The
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980) and the
Free Will and Determinism scale (FAD-plus, Paulhus and
Carey, 2011). The IRI is composed of four subscales. Perspective
taking is the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological
point of view of others. Fantasy taps respondents’ tendencies to
transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings and actions
of fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays. Empathic
concern assesses “other-oriented” feelings of sympathy and
concern for unfortunate others. Finally, the Personal distress
measures “self-oriented” feelings of personal anxiety and unease
intense interpersonal settings (Davis, 1980). The FAD-plus is
also composed of four subscales: the Free will subscale (e.g.,
“People have complete control over the decisions they make”),
the Scientific Determinism subscale (e.g., “Your genes determine
your future”), the Fatalistic Determinism subscale (e.g., “Fate
already has a plan for everyone”) and the Unpredictability
subscale (e.g., “People’s future cannot be predicted”). The order
of the questionnaires was counterbalanced across participants.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants read an
information sheet about the experimental procedure and
the aim of the experiment. The two co-participants signed their
individual consent forms simultaneously, ensuring that they
were both aware of the other’s consent. In the consent form,
participants were clearly asked to state whether or not they
understood that they could withdraw from the experiment at
any time without financial damage and without motivating their
decision. Participants were equally divided in two groups: The
Control group (five male dyads and five female dyads = 20
participants) and the No Free will group (five male dyads and
five female dyads = 20 participants). In the Control group,
participants were requested to read an excerpt from the book
of Francis Crick (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis that did not
mention free will, but rather explained how psychologists tried
to develop a method to assess consciousness (Vohs and Schooler,
2008). In the No Free will group, participants were given another
excerpt from the same book that challenges the existence of free
will by mentioning for instance that human behavior is totally
determined by genetics. Both texts were translated in French by
two native speakers. Participants were given a few minutes to
carefully read the text and were informed they would have to
write an abstract about the text at the end of the experimental
session.
In each experimental condition, three persons were present
in the room. Two participants engaged in two different roles
(i.e., the “agent” and the “victim”), and the experimenter. The
roles of the participants were assigned randomly, based on where
participants chose to sit when they arrived in the room. One
participant started by being the agent and the other participant
the “victim.” Of thirty-nine participants, only one asked to start
by playing the role of the “victim.” These roles were switched
mid-way through the experiment, making the procedure fully
reciprocal, similarly to the method used by Caspar et al. (2016).
The agent and the “victim” were seated at a table, facing each
other. A keyboard was placed between them, oriented toward
the agent but visible by both. The experimental task ran on
a computer located on the agent’s right side, with the screen
visible only to the agent and to the experimenter. The agent
was instructed to press a key on the keyboard at a time she
chose after the start of the trial, using the right index finger.
A tone occurred after the key press. The delay between key press
and tone was set to vary randomly at 200, 500, and 800 ms.
If a shock was delivered, the shock occurred at the same time
as the tone, so as to avoid perceptual bias. The participants’
task was to estimate the delay between the agent’s key press
and the tone. They were informed that the delay would vary
randomly on a trial-by-trial basis, between 1 and 1,000 ms (they
were reminded that 1,000 ms equals 1 s). Participants were
also told (1) to make use of all possible numbers between 1
and 1,000, as appropriate, (2) to avoid restricting their answer
space (i.e., not to keep using numbers falling between 100 and
200), and (3) to avoid rounding. Each participant received a
paper sheet with 60 empty boxes in which to write their time
estimates in each condition of the task. Participants’ answers were
hidden from view of the other participants by a cardboard so
as to avoid participants being biased by the other participants’
answers.
Two experimental conditions followed a short training
session, in which participants could practice the interval estimate
procedure without any shocks or money to earn. All participants
started with a specific amount of money, i.e., €12, for their
participation. In the free-choice condition, agents were instructed
that they could freely choose to increase their remuneration for
the experiment by delivering a painful electric shock to the victim,
using the appropriate key on the keyboard (“F” to deliver a shock
and “H” to not deliver the shock). They were told that they
were totally free to choose how to act. The agents earned €0.05
each time they decided to deliver a painful electric shock to the
“victim.” They earned no money if they decided not to deliver
a shock. In the coercive condition, the experimenter sat next to
the agent and ordered her/him, on each trial, to deliver or not a
painful electric shock to the victim (Figure 1). The experimenter
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental set-up.
ordered the agent to deliver a shock on 30/60 trials, in a random
order.
There were 60 trials per condition (20 trials for each action-
tone delay, in randomized order), resulting in a total of 240
trials (120 per role). Participants always performed the free-
choice condition before the coercive condition to ensure that
the number or shocks they choose to deliver in the free-choice
condition would not be influenced by any other prior conditions.
Pain was delivered using a constant current stimulator
(Digitimer DS7A) connected to two electrodes placed on the back
of victims’ left hand, visible to the agent. Participants’ individual
pain threshold was determined for the two participants after they
had signed the consent form, before starting the experiment.
This threshold was determined by increasing stimulation in steps
of 1 mA, following the procedure described in Caspar et al.
(2016). The mean stimulation level selected by this procedure was
31.85 mA (SD = 15.9, pulse duration: 200 s). Before starting the
procedure, participants were told that the muscular stimulation
would not cause any permanent damage or entail any risk of
being burned.
At the end of the experiment, participants had to
resume reading the text they had read at the beginning of
the experimental session. In a post-session questionnaire,
participants were invited to describe in a couple of words what
they had felt during the experiment and what their thoughts were
about this experiment. Finally, participants were paid separately
based on their earned financial gain during the experiment.
RESULTS
To remember, we assessed whether or not disbelief in free will
could influence: (1) the number of immoral actions performed,
(2) vindictive behaviors, and (3) the implicit feeling of agency
toward those events. We systematically explored the influence of
the experimental group and gender on those dependant variables.
In addition, we controlled whether or not the core beliefs of
participants (as measured with the FAD-plus) could modify the
results.
Number of Shocks Freely Administered
When participants were agents, they freely chose to administer
painful electric shocks to the victim in 36.29/60 trials (95%
CI = 30.41–42.17, min 0, max 60). We conducted a factorial
ANOVA with the number of shocks that agents freely delivered
as the dependent variable and Gender (male, female) and Group
(Control, No Free will) as fixed factors (see Figure 2A). The main
effect of Gender was not significant (p > 0.7). The main effect of
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FIGURE 2 | Graphical representation of the number of shocks freely delivered (A) and the vindictive behavior (B). All tests were two-tailed. ∗∗∗ indicates a
p-value ≤ 0.001 and ∗ indicates a p-value between 0.01 and 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Graphical representation of the interval estimates. All tests were two-tailed. ∗∗∗ indicates a p-value ≤ 0.001.
Group was significant [F(1,38) = 5.695, p < 0.025, η2 = 0.140].
Participants in the “No Free will” group freely delivered fewer
shocks (30.90, 95% CI = 24.47–37.33) than participants in the
Control group (41.45, 95% CI = 35.19–47.70). The interaction
Gender × Group was significant [F(1,38) = 22.492, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.391]. Independent sample t-tests indicated that the
number of shocks freely delivered did not differ according to
group for male participants (p > 0.1), but differed significantly
for female participants [t(18) = 6.459, p < 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 6.55], suggesting that the procedure more strongly modified
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the behavior of female participants in comparison with male
participants1 .
A previous study showed that the number of shocks
administered was negatively correlated with the reported level of
empathy of participants (Caspar et al., 2016). A factorial ANOVA
showed that the empathy scores (IRI) did not differ between
Groups (p > 0.5), but they did differ as a function of Gender
[F(1,38) = 8.040, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.187]. Women (99.7, 95%
CI = 94.5–104.9) reported being more empathetic than men
(89.3, 95% CI = 84–94.6). The interaction Group × Gender was
not significant (p > 0.4), suggesting that the reduced number of
shocks delivered by female participants in the no free will group
was not due to difference in empathy scores.
We additionally controlled whether or not the core beliefs
of participants in each sub-group could constitute a confound
in our results, given that basic beliefs differ between genders
(Paulhus and Carey, 2011; Caspar et al., in press). We thus
conducted a factorial ANOVA on each subscale of the FAD-plus.
This showed that the interaction Group × Gender was never
significant (all ps > 0.7). This result in turn suggests that the
reduced number of shocks delivered by female participants in
the no free will group was not due to differences in their core
beliefs.
Vindictive Behaviors
To assess vindictive behavior, we performed a linear regression
with the number of shocks that participants who were victim
first received as the independent variable and the number of
shocks they gave when they were agents as the dependent variable
(Figure 2B). In the Control group, we observed that the more
shocks participants received when they were victims, the more
shocks they administered when they were agents [t(9) = 8.149,
p < 0.001, Beta = 0.945]. In the No Free will group, we observed
a reduced but similar pattern of results [t(9) = 3.388, p = 0.01,
Beta = 0.768]. When gender was taken into account, both male
and female participants displayed vindictive behavior in the
control group [t(4) = 4.338, p = 0.023, Beta = 0.929 – shocks
received: 31, SD = 20.44 – shocks given: 32.40, SD = 20.51 and
t(4) = 4.298, p = 0.023, Beta = 0.928, respectively – shocks
received: 48.20, SD = 12.69 – shocks given: 49, SD = 11.35],
while in the No Free will group, vindictive behavior was no
longer significant for female participants (p> 0.08, Beta= 0.749)
but remained significant for male participants [t(3) = 7.046,
p = 0.020, Beta = 0.980 – shocks received: 35.5, SD = 10.84 –
shocks given: 40.25, SD = 14.15]. The female participants in
the No free will group gave less shocks than what they received
when they were agents (shocks received: 22.50, SD = 19.95 –
shocks given: 19.50, SD = 10.44). All other groups administered
more shocks when they were agent than when they were
victims.
We again examined whether the core beliefs of participants,
as measured by the FAD-plus, could explain the differences that
we observed between groups. We centered all predictor
1We replicated these analyses by taking into account only participants who
were agents first. The interaction Group × Gender remained significant
[F(1,18)= 11.581, p= 0.004, η2 = 0.436] and exhibited the same pattern of results.
variables (Free will, Scientific Determinism, Fatalistic
Determinism, and Unpredictability) before building the
model. We observed that the core beliefs of participants
did not influence those results. For female participants, the
effect of group was always strongly significant (all ps < 0.01)
and none of the predictor variables modified this result (all
ps > 0.1). For male participants, we observed that their basic
beliefs in Fatalistic Determinism influenced their vindictive
behavior (R2 = 0.962, p = 0.023), irrespective of the group.
Results showed that the higher male participants scored on
Fatalistic Determinism, the less vindictive they were. For
female participants, we observed that their basic beliefs in
free will marginally influenced their vindictive behaviors
(R2 = 0.896, p = 0.06) irrespective of the group. The higher
female participants scored on Free will, the more vindictive they
were.
Interval Estimates
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with Condition
(Free-Choice, Coercive) and Outcome (Harmful, Non harmful)
as within-subject factors and Group (Control, No Free will)
and Gender (Male, Female) as between-subject factors on
agent’s interval estimates. Importantly, when participants freely
administered the maximum (60/60 shocks, N = 5) or the
minimum (0/60 shocks, N = 2) amount of shocks, their data were
not taken into account in this full factorial ANOVA. The main
effect of Condition was significant [F(1,28) = 28.870, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.508], with coercion leading to longer interval estimates
than free choice (494 ms, 95% CI: 453–536 and 443 ms, 95%
CI: 401–485), see Figure 3. Importantly, none of the interactions
of the factor Condition with the other factors were significant
(all ps > 0.1). The main effect of Outcome was not significant
(p > 0.2), nor was its interaction with the other factors (all
ps > 0.2). Neither the main effect of Gender (p > 0.2) nor the
main effect of Group (p > 0.9) were significant. Other triple
interactions and the quadruple interaction also failed to reach
significance (all ps > 0.078).
We performed a multiple linear regression to assess whether
the subscales of the FAD-plus could predict better than the Group
the “coercion effect,” that is, the difference between interval
estimates in the free-choice condition and the coercive condition.
We observed that the Unpredictability subscale was the best
predictor of the coercion effect (R2 = 0.198, p = 0.017). The
higher participants scored on Unpredictability, the higher the
coercion effect was.
DISCUSSION
Here, we explored to what extent (dis)belief in free will could
influence the moral decisions of participants in a task in which
they were either free to choose or coerced to inflict an electric
choc to their co-participants in exchange for a small financial
benefit. Results mainly converge toward a prosocial benefit of
disbelief in free will.
We first observed that participants in the No Free will
group inflicted fewer shocks in the free-choice condition than
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participants in the Control group. However, this result appears
to be mainly driven by gender. Indeed, while female participants
inflicted fewer shocks in the No Free will group than in the
Control group, this difference was not significant for male
participants. In additional analyses, we examined whether or not
this effect could be related to the reduction of vindictive behavior.
We observed that the effect was similar if we only took into
account participants who were agents first, thus eliminating the
influence of role reversal. Moreover, we observed that the core
beliefs of participants did not differ in these groups, and neither
did their scores on empathy. Taken together, this suggests that
the reduction of immoral behavior in the no free will group for
female participants stems from the induced beliefs. The observed
prosocial benefits of disbelief in free will may appear to go against
the mainstream, since the literature mainly converged toward
the prosocial benefits of believing in free will (e.g., Vohs and
Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009). However, numerous
factors differed in our study, notably the social aspects associated
with the presence of two co-participants who were aware that
roles would be reversed at the middle of the experiment. Future
work is required to explore this question more thoroughly.
Additionally, we observed that vindictive behavior was
reduced for female participants in the no free will group
compared to other sub-groups, and that the higher female
participants scored on free will, the more vindictive they were.
Importantly, our paradigm made it possible to investigate
whether disbelief in free will influences the occurrence of
vindictive behavior without the need to mention the notion
of punishment to our participant, such as in previous studies.
This tendency to behave vindictively is consistent with previous
studies that showed that people who believe in determinism are
less punitive and have reduced retributive attitudes toward others
(e.g., Westlake and Paulhus, 2007; Krueger et al., 2014; Shariff
et al., 2014). When people have to express a judgment about
the morality of someone else’s behavior, their beliefs about the
cause of these behaviors may greatly influence how they judge
the severity of the act. Reducing people’s beliefs in free will might
make them consider that individual responsibility is reduced,
thus making them less retributive toward others.
Taken together, our results emphasize the importance of
taking gender into account when studying beliefs. The gender
of participants has indeed seldom been taken into account
when assessing the influence of (dis)beliefs in free will on
prosocial behaviors. Several studies that explored similar issues
have often reported a discrepancy between males and females in
their sample: female participants outnumber male participants,
while importantly several studies pointed out they differ in
their basic beliefs (Paulhus and Carey, 2011; Caspar et al., in
press). Generally, men score higher in scientific determinism
and women score higher in free will. It is thus plausible that
inducing disbeliefs in free will has different effects on male and
female participants. Therefore, some of the previous results could
be mediated by such differences. The question of why female
participants appear to be more influenced by the procedure
remains pending. Several studies discussed gender difference
in terms of factors, such as influenceability (e.g., Eagly, 1983),
persuasibility (e.g., Janis and Field, 1959) or suggestibility (e.g.,
Page and Green, 2007), but such results seem unreliable (e.g.,
Pollard et al., 2004; Dienes et al., 2009). Therefore, future
studies are needed to investigate the possible influence of further
factors that could explain differences between male and female
participants.
Contrary to previous studies (e.g., Lynn et al., 2014), we
did not find that implicit SoA was higher in the control group
compared to the no free will group. Rather we observed no
statistical difference between the two groups in their interval
estimates. In our paradigm, the implicit SoA was assessed in a
moral context in which participants could decide to perform an
action that was morally and socially acceptable or not, whereas
in previous studies participants only had to judge the temporal
delay between their action and a neutral tone without human
interactions. In our daily life, however, our actions are seldom
devoid of meaningful, valenced outcomes. When humans act,
there is a purpose that is generally congruent with their goals
or beneficial for themselves. Several studies have indeed shown
that positive outcomes (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013) increase SoA.
When participants have to focus on their own actions because
the consequences have a deep impact on another person, it
is possible that (dis)belief in free will becomes less significant
for the measure associated with the intentional binding itself.
Interestingly, we did not find that disbelief in free will affects SoA
over morally inacceptable outcomes, such as initially considered.
This is probably due to the combination of a negative outcome
(i.e., delivering harm) and a positive outcome (i.e., earning
additional money), which neutralized the effect (Takahata et al.,
2012; Yoshie and Haggard, 2013). This might suggest that
monetary gain can delude morality over negative outcomes, such
as harming people, no matter people’s beliefs.
In the present study, we observed that the coercion effect was
also present for male participants, thus extending previous results
(Caspar et al., 2016). This suggests that the gender may have no
direct effect on the mechanisms at work under coercion, but it
does not eliminate the possibility that obedience is sensitive to
such factors. Unexpectedly, we observed that part of the variance
of the coercion effect was influenced by the unpredictability
subscale. The higher participants scored on unpredictability (e.g.,
“Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random”), the
higher the coercion effect was. One possibility is that participants
who consider that life is but a series of random events are more
susceptible to let themselves go under coercion. However, this
result has to be taken with caution. The equivalence between
the size of the responses in terms of interval estimations and
the feeling of agency has not been observed in a reliable
manner.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we observed that disbelief in free will had a positive
impact on the morality of decisions toward others. The present
work extends previous research by showing that additional
factors, such as gender, could influence the impact of (dis)belief
in free will on prosocial and antisocial behaviors. Our results
also showed that previous results relative to the (moral) context
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underlying the paradigm in use are not always replicated. The
road toward progress in our understanding of how such beliefs
influence human behavior remains long and arduous, but it
clearly appears that both beliefs in free will and determinism can
have positive impacts on moral-decision makings – a finding that
challenges current thinking.
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